


John Elliott | Security Advisor @ Jscrambler

# The Challenge of Managing e-Commerce JavaScript

# About Me



# Important Disclaimers

1. I have not been a QSA since 2012.
2. I am not your assessor.
3. Although I was part of the working group that developed PCI DSS v4.0, you should not consider anything I say as a definitive interpretation of the standard.
4. These are all my own views, not Jscrambler's, or the card brand where I used to work.
5. I have no "inside knowledge" of the thoughts of the PCI SSC or the card brands.
6. You should:
  - a) Make your own judgement based on the words and objectives in the requirements.
  - b) Ask your assessor.
  - c) Ask the PCI SSC.
  - d) Ask the card brands (FAQ 1142).



Process

Technology

People



Process

Technology

People

# The Problem

## Technical

Every bit of JavaScript has access to any page element.

## Practical

The web is now built by assembling JavaScript in the browser


## Vulnerability

The attack surface is all first- and third-party sources.  
Tag managers, and JavaScript loaded by tag managers

## Threat

This is how most data is lost from e-commerce environments


# The Attack Surface



# Tag Manager

<https://business.adobe.com/blog/basics/tag-manager>

- “A tag is a piece of JavaScript code that is placed on a website.”
- “Tag managers help marketers manage tags from a user interface instead of directly manipulating the website’s source code.”
- “A tag manager shortens web development cycles. It frees up developer time so they can do other important work instead, and allows marketers to gather, organize, and manage website data better.”



A system designed to get information security and change control out of the way so that marketing and digital departments could add any random JavaScript to an organization's website.

**100**  
**Scripts**

**52%**  
**First party**

**48%**  
**Third party**

*Source: Jscrambler research*

**48**

**Third-  
party  
scripts**

**13**

**Domains  
(mean)**

**35**

**Domains  
(max)**

*Source: Jscrambler research*

# How Does PCI DSS v4.0 Aim to Reduce the Risk?

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### 6.4.3 Defined Approach


**All payment page scripts that are loaded and executed in the consumer's browser are managed as follows:**

- A method is implemented to confirm that each script is authorized.
- A method is implemented to assure the integrity of each script.
- An inventory of all scripts is maintained with written justification as to why each is necessary

### Customized Approach

Unauthorized code cannot be present in the payment page as it is rendered in the consumer's browser.


# Requirement 6.4.3



Reduce the attack surface

Not  
malicious

# In an Ideal World: New Script



# In an Ideal World: Changed Script

Business

Request to  
add changed  
JavaScript to  
page




Document  
necessity

InfoSec


IT Operations



# In an Ideal World: Changed Script



# In an Ideal World: Changed Script



# The Easy (Free) Technology Solution

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Content Security Policy (CSP)  
Sub-resource Integrity (SRI)


# Content Security Policy (CSP)

Ideally set in the HTTP header


Restricts where JavaScript can be loaded

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';  
script-src safescripts.foo.com
```

# In an Ideal World: New Script



# In an Ideal World: New Script | CSP



# Sub-resource Integrity (SRI)

Generate a hash for every JavaScript on the page

Add the hash to the SCRIPT tag

```
<script src="https://foo.com/myscript.js" integrity="sha384-  
oqVuAfXRKap7fdgcCY5uykM6+R9GqQ8K/uxy9rx7HNQlIGY11kPzQho1wx4JwY8wC" >  
</script>
```


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
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</script>
```


# In an Ideal World: New Script | SRI



# In an Ideal World: Changed Script | CSP



# In an Ideal World: Changed Script | CSP & SRI



# So What's The Problem?

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# New Scripts


**1000**  
**Scripts**

**52%**  
**First party**

**48%**  
**Third party**

*Source: Jscrambler research*

# In an Ideal World: New Script



# First Party | New Script

Request to  
ADD NEW  
JavaScript to  
page

- Who wants to add JavaScript?
  - Marketing
    - Via a tag manager
  - Development
  - Digital
  - IT Operations

# Action



1. Who in the entity can add a **new JavaScript** to the payment page?
2. How do they do it?
3. Can you enforce a change control process for new first party scripts?

# Changed Scripts

**1000**  
**Scripts**

**52%**  
**First party**

*Source: Jscrambler research*



# Action. First Parties and SRI



1. Does JavaScript change in its own when requested (i.e. Dynamic)?
2. Who in the entity can **change** existing **JavaScript**?
3. **Would they make a request?**
4. Can you enforce a change control process?
5. How/can will you update the hashes?
6. What automated QA can you include in this process?

Why did he ask  
“What automated  
QA can you include  
in this process”?

SRI fails silently


# Changed Scripts

**100**  
**Scripts**

**48%**  
**Third party**

*Source: Jscrambler research*

# In an Ideal World: Third-party | Changed Script



# Thirds Party | Changed Script

Request to  
CHANGE  
JavaScript

- This is probably nonsense

# Action. Third-parties and SRI



1. Would all third parties notify you via their change control process?
2. Can they send a copy of the JavaScript or give you a hash?
3. Will they wait until all entitles confirm they are ready for the change?
4. How will you update the hashes?
5. Is it dynamic anyway?

# Summary

Chart Title



# Action. Process Mapping



1. What's your current process for **adding** new JavaScript?
2. What's your current process for **changing** JavaScript (if any)?
  - a) Any automation?
  - b) Any dynamic scripts?
3. It will not be the same for first-party and third-party?

# Four Business Processes

**New**  
**1<sup>st</sup> Party**

**Change**  
**1<sup>st</sup> Party**

**New**  
**3<sup>rd</sup> Party**

**Change**  
**3<sup>rd</sup> Party**

# So What Are The Options?

---

Pragmatic Management and Compliance



# Contrast

## Entity A

- 25 First-party scripts
- All managed by the dev team
- Added via automated CI / CD pipeline
- 1 Third-party script (payment processor)

## Entity B

- 6 First-party scripts, part of the framework
- Framework updated in strict change control
- 35 Third- & fourth-party scripts added by digital and marketing (tag mgr)

## Entity C

- 200 First-party scripts, dynamically generated by website code
- 120 Third- and fourth- party scripts added by marketing (tag manger)

### 6.4.3 Defined Approach

**All payment page scripts that are loaded and executed in the consumer's browser are managed as follows:**

- A method is implemented to confirm that each script is **authorized**.
- A method is implemented to assure the integrity of each script.
- An inventory of all scripts is maintained with written justification as to why each is necessary

### Customized Approach

Unauthorized code cannot be present in the payment page as it is rendered in the consumer's browser.

## 11.6.1

### Defined Approach

**A change- and tamper-detection mechanism is deployed as follows:**

- To alert personnel to **unauthorized** modification (including indicators of compromise, changes, additions, and deletions) to the HTTP headers and the contents of payment pages as received by the consumer browser.
- The mechanism is configured to evaluate the received HTTP header and payment page.
- The mechanism functions are performed as follows:
  - At least once every seven days, OR
  - Periodically

# Focus on Authorization

6.4.3

**New scripts need  
to be authorized**

11.6.1

**Alert on  
unauthorized changes**



## What the Standard Does Not Say

“Unauthorized  
scripts must  
be blocked”



## What the Standard Does Not Say

~~“Unauthorized  
scripts must  
be blocked”~~



# Multiple Authorization Processes?

Things to discuss with your assessor

You need to think about multiple, different, processes for authorization:

1. New first-party scripts
2. Changes to first-party scripts
3. New third-party scripts
4. Changes to third-party scripts

# Three Types Of Processes & Authorization

Default  
authorize

**Low- or zero-risk  
changes**


Pre-  
authorize

**Before  
the page is changed**


Post-  
authorize


**After  
the page is changed**

# Post-deployment Authorization: New Script



# Post-change Authorization: Changed Script





**If you can't use  
CSP and SRI,  
you'll probably  
need a tool**

**(this is the technology part)**

Important take-away.

Don't buy a tool until you've understood your environment and script management processes.

# Tool Types



Proxies  
and CDNs



Scanners



Agents

# Reverse Proxies and CDNs



- Sit between the web server and the browser
- Can detect changes in first-party scripts
- Some will also retrieve third-party scripts and verify them
  - Inventory and authorization workflow
- Can dynamically manage CSP

# Scanners



- Synthetic users (bots)
- Retrieve page, all first- and third-party scripts
  - Make inventory, start authorization process
- Look for and alert changes
- Can't always see everything
  - There is no perfection in this exercise

# Agents



- JavaScript that is loaded first into the page
- Can manage any other JavaScript
- Can "watch" what other JavaScript does.
- Send telemetry back to make:
  - Inventory and kick off the authorization workflow
- Some can block malicious behavior

# We've Reached the End


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# Summary



- Managing JavaScript is hard
  - More = harder
  - Third-party = even harder
- Map processes and discover owners
- Probably need separate processes:
  - First- and third-party
  - New and changed
- Multiple kinds of authorization:
  - Default-, pre-, and post-
- Don't buy a tool until you understand your business.



Remove all  
JavaScript from  
your Payment  
(and Parent)  
Pages



Remove all  
third-party  
JavaScript from  
your Payment  
(and Parent)  
Pages